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Abstract
We study an auction where two licenses to operate on a new market are sold.
Winners ﬁnance their bids on a competitive debt market. Due to limited liability,
t h ea m o u n to fd e b ta ﬀects their behavior on the product market. In equilibrium,
consumer prices are lower than with a beauty contest, where ﬁrms obtain their li-
censes for free. Winning bids are lower than in a model where ﬁrms have internal
funds. Higher bids cannot be ﬁnanced due to credit rationing. Expected net ﬁrm
proﬁts are strictly positive, although ﬁrms are a priori identical and have the same
information.
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During the last decade, license auctions in the US and Europe sparked a huge interest, both
from academics and from the general public. In the US, the FCC auctioned licenses to use
the electromagnetic spectrum for personal communication services. Between July 1994 and
July 1998, 16 auctions were held, where 5,893 licenses were sold. Total revenues were $22.9
billion dollars (Cramton and Schwartz, 2000; for more on the design of these auctions,
see e.g. McAfee and McMillan, 1996, or McMillan 1994). Throughout Europe, licenses
for ”third generation” (3G) mobile telecommunication (or UMTS) took place during 2000
and 2001 (see e.g. Van Damme, 2002). These auctions, held in 9 countries, raised over
$100 billion, or over 1.5% of GDP. The revenue per inhabitant diﬀered greatly per country.
(Klemperer, 2002a).
Academic economists tend to analyze such auctions using standard auction theory. This
theory stresses the asymmetric information aspect of auctions. Typically, the following
assumptions are made. One good is being auctioned. Bidders know their own valuation,
or at least their own signal about the true value of the good being auctioned. They also
know the distribution of valuations or signals of the other bidders. Given that information,
bidders determine their optimal bids. There are many variations on this basic model. (For
recent surveys, see Wolfstetter, 1996, or Klemperer, 1999).
Increasingly however, it is argued that the standard model may not capture all the
relevant aspects of contexts like license auctions. It is argued that too much attention
is given to technicalities concerning asymmetric information, and too little attention is
given to the market structure and industrial organization aspects of such auctions. One
particular vocal exponent of this view is Klemperer (2002b). Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000a)
make a similar point. See also Jehiel and Moldovanu (2002). Hence, we need models that
stress the competitive implications of the way licenses are auctioned. This paper does
exactly that.
One important aspect of license auctions is that the value of a license is not something
that is exogenously given. Rather, this value is also determined by the outcome of the
2auction. Suppose two licenses are being sold. Ultimately, the value of a license equals the
expected proﬁts that can be made on the market where the winners of the licenses will
compete. This depends on the eﬃciency of the ﬁrm winning a license, but also on the
eﬃciency of the ﬁrm winning the other license. Therefore, a ﬁrm bidding on a license has
to take into account not only its own information, but also who he thinks will win the other
license. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000b) study a model in which bidders do care as to who
wins the auction: the type of the winner aﬀects the payoﬀ of the bidders that do not win.
Yet, in their model, only one good is being sold, so winners of the auction do not compete
with each other. In their model, the external eﬀects of the identity of the auction winner
on the others are exogenously given, and not determined endogenously in the competition
stage of the model.
A second striking aspect of license auctions is that winning ﬁrms often have to take on
debt to be able to ﬁnance their bid (see e.g. The Economist, 2002). From the industrial
organization literature, it is known that the amount of debt a ﬁrm has, aﬀects how it
competes. Brander and Lewis (1986) show that ﬁr m st h a th a v em o r ed e b t ,c o m p e t em o r e
aggressively — because of limited liability. Their model has Cournot competition and
uncertainty, for example about the level of marginal costs. Only after all decisions have
been made, the uncertainty is resolved. The authors show that in this setup, more debt
implies higher equilibrium quantities, and hence a lower equilibrium price. The eﬀect is
due to limited liability. If a ﬁrm’s operating proﬁts fall below its debt, it only pays the
operating proﬁts to the bank. When competing, ﬁrms maximize their expected operating
proﬁts minus the actual repayment to the bank. If operating proﬁts fall below the debt
level, the ﬁrm has zero payoﬀ. This will occur if the realization of marginal cost turns out
to be high. If marginal cost is low, the ﬁrm does have a strictly positive payoﬀ.H e n c e ,
a ﬁrm focuses on strategies that yield high payoﬀsi ng o o ds t a t e s ,i . e .w h e nm a r g i n a lc o s t
is low. Such strategies are called aggressive strategies. With higher debt, marginal cost
need to be lower for a ﬁrm to have a positive payoﬀ. Therefore, higher debt implies that
ﬁrms focus on cases with lower marginal cost and apply more aggressive strategies. In
the context of quantity competition this implies setting a larger quantity. This results
3in a lower price. For license auctions, this implies that the amount of debt that winning
ﬁrms will take on aﬀects their expected proﬁts in the post-auction market, and hence their
bidding strategies in the auction.
In this paper, we model these issues. In our model, two licenses to operate on some
new market are auctioned. The two winners of the auction will thus establish a duopoly.
A number of a priori identical ﬁrms participate in the auction. The two winners ﬁnance
their bids on a competitive debt market. After the auction, and after ﬁnancing the bids,
the two winners compete on the product market. We assume that ﬁrms have symmetric
but incomplete information. There is uncertainty with respect to the marginal costs that
prevail in the competition stage. When ﬁrms place higher bids, they also have to take on
higher debts, which in turn aﬀects their behavior on the product market. Firms take all
these eﬀects into account when placing their bids. We study how bidding behavior on the
auction market is ultimately aﬀected.
Our model yields some surprising insights. First, the winners of the auction have
expected proﬁts that are strictly positive. This is surprising, since a priori all ﬁrms are
identical, and we don’t have asymmetric information. Hence, one would expect to see
proﬁts being driven down to zero. This however is not the case, since the equilibrium of
our model exhibits credit rationing. Winning bidders, even though they make positive
expected proﬁts, will not be outbid. Any higher bid would yield a debt level that implies
negative net expected proﬁts for bondholders. A higher level of debt will make ﬁrms more
aggressive on the product market, reducing the probability that the debt will be repaid.
Hence, a ﬁrm would be willing to bid more if only it could obtain funding, but it cannot.
Second, we ﬁnd that in our model, equilibrium consumer prices are lower than they are
in a case where ﬁrms obtain their license for free. One of the main concerns in the popular
press is that the use of auctions will increase prices that consumers ultimately have to pay.
Firms will recoup the costs of spectrum rights by simply adding a mark-up to consumer
prices, the argument goes, so the higher these costs, the higher the mark-up. Of course,
this argument is invalid. When prices paid at an auction are simply sunk costs, they do
not inﬂuence prices that ﬁrms charge to consumers. In our model, higher fees even lead to
4lower prices. This is due to the strategic eﬀect of debt: as ﬁrms take on more debt, they
will compete more aggressively on the product market.1 For the same reason, consumer
prices in our model are also lower than in a model where winners can ﬁnance their bids
out of internal funds.
A third result we ﬁnd is that winning bids are lower with debt than they are when
ﬁrms have internal funds, and do not have to resort to the debt market to ﬁnance their
bids. This is the case because of two reasons. First, since ﬁrms with debt compete more
aggressively, equilibrium expected operating proﬁts are decreasing in debt levels, which in
turn implies that with debt, equilibrium bids will be lower. Moreover, with internal funds,
ﬁrms simply continue bidding until their bids are equal to their expected operating proﬁts.
In the model with debt, they stop bidding before they reach that level, because of credit
rationing.
Chowdhry and Nanda (1993) also study the strategic role of debt in an auction — but
in a context entirely diﬀerent from ours. They study a takeover contest, in which many
raiders bid to take over a ﬁrm. In Goeree (2003), competition after the auction also aﬀects
bidding behavior. In his model, bidders use their bid to signal their private information
when there is an aftermarket. Oﬀerman and Potters (2001) present experimental evidence
that a high license fee paid at the auction makes it more likely that winners will collude
— so higher license fees may lead to higher consumer prices. Clayton and Ravid (2002)
study the eﬀect of the debt a ﬁrm currently has on their bidding behavior in the US FCC
auctions. They ﬁnd that, as debt levels increase, ﬁrms tend to reduce their bids. Note
however that they study the amount of debt a ﬁrm already has when the auction takes
place. We study the amount of debt a ﬁrm has to take on as a consequence of winning the
auction. Moreover, in our model, the amount of debt is endogenously determined.
The setup of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we present our model, where
we leave the exact mode of competition at the competition stage unspeciﬁed. We only
put some weak assumptions on the equilibrium proﬁts of the competition stage, which we
use to derive our results. In section 3 we solve this model. In section 4 we summarize
1We also made this argument, but only intuitively, in Haan and Toolsema (2000).
5our main results. In section 5 we show that three standard models of competition, the
linear Hotelling, Bertrand, and Cournot models, satisfy the assumptions we put on our
proﬁt function and therefore satisfy our framework. We derive the equilibria for numerical
examples based on these three competition models, and show that our results hold for all
three cases. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We have a three-stage model. In the ﬁrst stage, the auction stage, N>2 bidders compete
in a sealed-bid license auction, where winning bidders pay their own bid. Alternatively,
we may assume a simultaneous ascending auction of the type that is often used in license
auctions (see e.g. Milgrom, 2000). For our results, this is not important. Firms are ex ante
identical. The two highest bidders obtain a license to operate in a new market. Without
loss of generality, the highest bidder will be denoted ﬁrm 1 and the second highest bidder
will be denoted ﬁrm 2. Their bids are denoted b1 and b2. In the case of ties, winners will
b ed e c i d e db yc o i nt o s s . I ns t a g e2 ,t h edebt stage, the two winning ﬁrms ﬁnance their
bids. They do so by issuing bonds on a perfectly competitive bond market. We will refer
to the buyers of these bonds as bondholders. Firm i obtains an amount bi to pay for its
bid, against the promise of repaying di at the end of the game. We assume that if it is not
the case that both ﬁrms are able to secure ﬁnancing in the debt stage, then the auction
will be declared void, and a new auction will be held. In stage 3, the competition stage,
the two winning ﬁrms compete on the output market. That is, they set strategic variables
s1 and s2, which may be either prices or quantities. When setting these, the ﬁrms still
face uncertainty with respect to market conditions. This assumption is necessary to have
a strategic eﬀect of debt. We model this as uncertainty about the marginal costs ﬁrms will
incur once operating. Marginal costs c are constant and equal for all ﬁrms, but unknown
in advance. They are drawn from a continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly positive probability
density function f(·) with domain [c,¯ c]. This is common knowledge. After setting their
strategic variables, uncertainty about marginal costs is resolved, consumers make their
6decisions and, if possible, debts are repaid. For simplicity, we assume no discounting.
In the remainder of this section, we give a detailed description of the three main stages
of the model: the auction stage, the debt stage, and the competition stage. We describe
these stages in the same order as we solve the model: by backward induction, starting with
the last stage. We end this section by giving a formal deﬁnition of the equilibrium in our
model.
Competition stage In this stage, the two ﬁrms that have won the auction in stage
1, and managed to obtain funding, compete on the output market. They do so by simul-
taneously setting a strategic variable. Let si ≥ 0d e n o t et h ev a l u eo ft h es t r a t e g i cv a r i a b l e
set by ﬁrm i, which may refer to either price or quantity. Expected proﬁts of each ﬁrm will
depend on debt levels that are determined in the debt stages, and the strategic variables
set by each ﬁr m .W ed e n o t et h ee x p e c t e dn e tp r o ﬁts of ﬁrm i,s oi t sp r o ﬁta f t e rr e p a y m e n t
of debt, as ΠF
i (si,s j,d i,d j), where di denotes the amount of debt ﬁrm i has taken on in the
debt stage. Subscripts refer to the identity of the ﬁrm, the superscript F indicates that we
are considering ﬁrms. We look for a Nash equilibrium in the competition subgame, hence
s
∗
i(di,d j) = argmax
si
Π
F
i (si,s
∗
j,d i,d j),
for i =1 ,2; j  = i. We assume existence and uniqueness of this equilibrium.
Suppose that marginal costs happen to be c. Note that this value is unknown when
ﬁrms set their strategic variable. The true value of c will only be revealed after these
are set. For such a given value c,w ed e ﬁne the operating proﬁts of ﬁrm i as its gross
proﬁts, before its debt is repaid. These operating proﬁts depend on c and on the strategic
variables the ﬁrms set. Hence we denote them as πi(si,s j,c). Obviously, operating proﬁts
equal revenues minus costs, and we can write πi(si,s j,c)=Ri(si,s j) − cqi(si,s j), with Ri
operating revenue of ﬁrm i,a n dqi the quantity sold by ﬁrm i. When the strategic variable
is quantity, we obviously have qi = si. When the strategic variable is price, qi will depend
on both prices via the demand function. In equilibrium, when values s∗
i and s∗
j are set, we
7can denote operating proﬁts of ﬁrm i when marginal costs are c,a s
π
∗
i (di,d j,c) ≡ πi
 
s
∗
i (di,d j),s
∗
j (dj,d i),c
 
= R
∗
i
 
s
∗
i (di,d j),s
∗
j (dj,d i)
 
− cq
∗
i(s
∗
i (di,d j),s
∗
j (dj,d i)). (1)
From this, it is easy to see that π∗
i (di,d j,c)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nc. We make the following
additional assumptions:
Assumption 1 π∗
i (di,d j,c) is strictly decreasing in dj for any c.
Assumption 2 π∗
i (d,d,c) is strictly decreasing in d for any c.
Assumption 1 states that the equilibrium operating revenues of a ﬁrm are decreasing
in the amount of debt that the competitor holds. More debt makes the competitor more
aggressive, which hurts ﬁrm i. Assumption 2 states that when both ﬁrms have the same
level of debt d, and when that common debt level increases, then operating revenues of
both ﬁrms decrease. In section 5, we show that these assumptions are satisﬁed in a model
with linear demand and either Hotelling competition, Bertrand competition, or Cournot
competition with diﬀerentiated products.
Debt stage In the debt stage, the two ﬁrms that have won the auction have to
ﬁnd bondholders who are willing to lend them the money to pay for their bids. When a
winning ﬁrm has submitted a bid bi ≥ 0, a debt contract can be represented by (bi,d i): ﬁrm
i receives bi now, in return for the promise to repay di at the end of the game. We assume
limited liability. A ﬁrm cannot make a repayment that is higher than its operating proﬁt
in the competition stage. If the operating proﬁts fall short, the ﬁrm goes bankrupt, and
the bondholders only receive the ﬁrm’s operating proﬁts, if any. Naturally, this is taken
into account when the debt contract is determined. Firms can make a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer to bondholders.
Consider the expected gross proﬁts to the bondholders. Suppose that ﬁrm i has debt
di. It can just repay its debt when π∗
i (di,d j,c)=di. In that case, gross operating proﬁts
8are just suﬃcient to cover the promised repayment di. Denote the value of c for which
this equality is satisﬁed as ˆ ci. The ﬁrm’s operating proﬁts are zero when π∗
i (di,d j,c)=0 .
Denote the value of c for which this equality is satisﬁed as ˇ ci, provided this value is smaller
than ¯ c. Otherwise, we have ˇ ci =¯ c. If c ≤ ˆ ci, ﬁrm i is able to fully repay its debt. Debtholders
then receive di. The probability that this occurs is denoted Pr(c ≤ ˆ ci). With c ∈ (ˆ ci,ˇ ci),
the ﬁrm makes positive operating proﬁts, but these are insuﬃcient to repay the debt di. In
that case, all operating proﬁts will be paid to the bondholders, and the ﬁrm’s net proﬁts
are zero. If c>ˇ ci, operating proﬁts are negative, and bondholders receive nothing. The
ﬁrm’s net proﬁts in this case are also zero. Note that, for given di and dj, the equilibrium
of the competition stage is uniquely determined by assumption. We can therefore write ˆ ci
and ˇ ci as a function of these debt levels: ˆ ci(di,d j)a n dˇ ci(di,d j). The expected repayment
to bondholders RB
i (di,d j) can thus be written as
R
B
i (di,d j)=P r ( c ≤ ˆ ci(di,d j))di +
  ˇ ci(di,dj)
ˆ ci(di,dj)
π
∗
i(di,d j,c)f(c)dc. (2)
Here, the superscript B refers to bondholders, and the subscript i refers to the fact that
these bondholders lend to ﬁrm i. The expected net proﬁts to bondholders are then given
by RB
i (di,d j) − bi.
We can now also give a formal expression for the expected net proﬁts of ﬁrm i: it will
earn operating proﬁts minus its debt, as long as c<ˆ ci. Otherwise, its proﬁts are zero.
Hence
Π
F
i (si,s j,d i,d j)=
  ˆ ci(di,dj)
c
(πi (si,s j,c) − di)f(c)dc. (3)
We assume
Assumption 3 RB
i (d,d) is strictly concave in d, and strictly positive for some d>0.
Thus, we assume that if ﬁrms have the same debt level, then the expected proﬁts
of bondholders are quasi-concave in that common debt level. Again, in section 5, we
show that the assumption is satisﬁed for the linear Hotelling, Cournot and Bertrand
models. Note that ﬁrms are a priori identical. Therefore, RB
1 (d,d)=RB
2 (d,d), so we
9can drop the subscript. We will refer to the unique maximizer of RB(d,d)a sd∗. Thus
d∗ ≡ argmaxd RB(d,d). Obviously, RB(d,d) is strictly increasing in d for 0 ≤ d<d ∗.
In the debt stage ﬁrms 1 and 2 now simultaneously set d1 and d2 such that their
expected proﬁts are maximized, given what will occur in the competition stage. For a
Nash equilibrium in the debt stage we thus need
d
∗
i(bi,b j) = argmax
di
  ˆ ci(di,d∗
j)
c
 
π
∗
i
 
di,d
∗
j
 
− di
 
f(c)dc,
s.t.
 
RB
i (di,d ∗
j) ≥ bi,
RB
j (d∗
j,d i) ≥ bj.
for i =1 ,2a n dj  = i. The condition stresses that a winning bidder has to assure that both
ﬁrms can ﬁnd ﬁnancing: the expected repayment to both bondholders has to be at least
equal to the amount of money they provided. If this cannot be satisﬁed, the auction will
be declared void. We will denote the Nash equilibrium proﬁts that follow from this stage
as ΠF∗
i (bi,b j). Formally
Π
F∗
i (bi,b j)=Π
F
i (s
∗
i,s
∗
j,d
∗
i(bi,b j),d
∗
j(bj,b i)),
where, for tractability, we have dropped the arguments (d∗
i,d ∗
j)o fs∗
i, w h i c hi nt u r na l s o
depend on bi and bj.
Auction stage In the auction stage, N>2i d e n t i c a lﬁrms submit a bid to obtain a
license. We assume that if it is not the case that both winners are able to secure ﬁnancing
in the debt stage, then the auction will be declared void, and a new auction will be held.
Note therefore that also a ﬁrm that is able to secure ﬁnancing will lose its license when
its competitor is not able to do so. This is to rule out cases in which one ﬁrm submits a
bid that is so high that the bond market is only willing to ﬁnance it if the other ﬁrm does
not obtain ﬁnancing. In that case, by submitting a very high bid, a ﬁr mm a yb ea b l et o
eﬀectively shut any competitor out of the market and obtain a monopoly. As a technical
condition, we assume that, if an auction has to be held again, the original winners both
receive some ﬁne ε, which can be inﬁnitely small. This is to rule out equilibria in which
10all ﬁrms always submit very high bids, and the auction is never resolved. The ﬁne ε can
even consist of the extra costs involved for a ﬁrm to participate in a second auction.
Formally, suppose that at the auction stage, ﬁrm k submits a bid Bk,k∈ {1,...,N}.
Expected net proﬁts of ﬁrm k at the auction stage can then be denoted ΠFa
k (B1,...B N).
The highest bid is b1 ≡ max{B1,...,B N}, the second highest bid b2 ≡ max{{B1,...,B N}\b1}.
For the case ties occur, we deﬁne T as the number of ﬁrms that have submitted the same
bid as the second-highest bidder: T ≡ #{k|Bk = b2}. Note that the highest bidder may
also be among these. Given the vector of bids, the probability of obtaining a license for
ﬁrm k now equals
Pk(B1,...,B N)=

  
  
0i f Bk <b 2
1
T if b1 >b 2 = Bk
2
T if b1 = b2 = Bk
1i fBk = b1 >b 2
and we have
Π
Fa
k (B1,...,B N)=Pk(B1,...,B N) · Π
F∗
i (s
∗
i,s
∗
j,d
∗
i(Bk,B −k)),d
∗
j(B−k,B k)),
with B−k =m a x{{B1,...B N}\Bk}.
Equilibrium concept Putting together all the elements of the three subgames, we
can now deﬁne the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the full game as follows
Deﬁnition 1 The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game described above consists
of bids (B∗
1,...B∗
N) for all bidders, and debt levels (d∗
1,d ∗
2) and strategic variables (s∗
1,s ∗
2)
for the two highest bidders, such that we have
1. Equilibrium at the competition stage:
s
∗
i =a r gm a x
si
Π
F
i (si,s
∗
j,d
∗
i,d
∗
j) = argmax
si
  ˆ ci(d∗
i ,d∗
j)
c
 
πi
 
si,s
∗
j,c
 
− d
∗
i
 
f(c)dc,
for i =1 ,2 and j  = i;
112. Equilibrium at the debt stage:
d
∗
i =a r g m a x
di
  ˆ ci(di,d∗
j)
c
 
π
∗
i
 
di,d
∗
j
 
− di
 
f(c)dc, (4)
s.t.
 
RB
i (di,d ∗
j) ≥ bi,
RB
j (d∗
j,d i) ≥ bj. (5)
for i =1 ,2 and j  = i;
3. Equilibrium at the auction stage:
B
∗
k =a r gm a x
Bk
Π
Fa
k (B
∗
1,...,B
∗
k−1,B k,B
∗
k+1,...,B
∗
N)
for all k ∈ {1,....N},
with all functions and variables deﬁned in the main text.
3S o l v i n g t h e m o d e l
We now derive the equilibrium of the model described in the previous section. We ﬁrst
present two lemma’s on RB
i (di,d j).
Lemma 1 RB
i (di,d j) is strictly decreasing in dj for any given di, i,j =1 ,2, i  = j.
Proof. Using Leibniz’s rule, from (2) the partial derivative of RB
i (di,d j) with respect
to dj is given by
∂
∂dj
R
B
i (di,d j)=
∂ Pr(c ≤ ˆ ci(di,d j))
∂dj
di
+π
∗
i(di,d j,ˇ ci(di,d j))f(ˇ ci(di,d j))
∂ˇ ci(di,d j)
∂dj
−π
∗
i(di,d j,ˆ ci(di,d j))f(ˆ ci(di,d j))
∂ˆ ci(di,d j)
∂dj
+
  ˇ ci(di,dj)
ˆ ci(di,dj)
∂π∗
i(di,d j,c)
∂dj
f(c)dc
From the deﬁnition of ˇ ci(di,d j), the second term in this expression equals zero. Further,
since π∗
i(di,d j,ˆ ci(di,d j)) = di and because f(c) is the probability density function of c,t h e
12ﬁrst and third terms cancel out. Thus, only the fourth term remains. This term is negative
because of assumption 1. This proves the lemma.
Thus, as the debt of ﬁrm j increases, the expected repayment to the bondholders of
ﬁrm i decreases. Intuitively, this can be seen as follows. From assumption 1, we have that
for every value of c, operating proﬁts of ﬁrm i decrease as the debt level of ﬁrm j increases.
Therefore, the probability that i will be able to repay its debt decreases. The proﬁts that
bondholders can capture when the ﬁrm cannot fully repay its debt, also decrease.
We also have
Lemma 2 RB
i (di,d) <R B
i (d,d) for all di <d≤ d∗.
Proof. Since di <d≤ d∗, we have from assumption 3 that RB
i (d,d) >R B
i (di,d i). From
lemma 1, we have RB
i (di,d i) >R B
i (di,d). Hence RB
i (d,d) >R B
i (di,d).
Now we turn to the equilibrium of the auction stage. Recall that d∗ ≡ argmaxd RB(d,d) >
0 and deﬁne b∗ ≡ RB(d∗,d ∗)=m a x d RB(d,d).
Theorem 1 The unique symmetric equilibrium of our model is
1. Bk = b∗ =m a x d RB(d,d), for k =1 ,...,N,
2. d∗
i =a r gm a x d RB(d,d), for i =1 ,2,
3. s∗
i =a r gm a x si ΠF
i (si,s ∗
j,d ∗
i,d ∗
j), for i =1 ,2,j = i.
Proof. T h ep r o o fp r o c e e d si nf o u rs t e p s . W ew i l le s t a b l i s ht h a tw ec a n n o th a v ea n
equilibrium in which one of the winning bids is lower than b∗ (step 3). Then, we show
that no ﬁrm has an incentive to defect to a higher bid when all ﬁrms bid b∗ (step 4).
Taken together, these steps imply that in the unique symmetric equilibrium both winning
bids equal b∗, provided that expected ﬁrm proﬁts are non-negative in that case. Before
establishing these steps, we show that ﬁrms can indeed obtain funding in this candidate
equilibrium, and that the only symmetric debt level that yields nonnegative net proﬁts to
the bondholders for b = b∗ is d∗ (step 1). Then, we show that ﬁrms’ proﬁts are indeed
13strictly positive in this equilibrium. (step 2). Therefore, any ﬁrm submitting a bid b<b ∗
can improve by bidding b = b∗ and having a probability of 2/N to obtain the equilibrium
ﬁrm proﬁts. Together, this proves the theorem.
1. The bond market is willing to ﬁnance any pair of bids (b1,b 2) for which b1 ≤ b∗ and
b2 ≤ b∗. – We only have to show that for such (b1,b 2)t h e r ee x i s t sap a i r( d1,d 2)
such that (5) is satisﬁed. But such debt levels do exist: using assumption 3 and
RB(0,0) = 0, bondholders make nonnegative net proﬁts when setting d1 = d2 = d∗.
2. If d1 = d2 = d∗,t h eﬁrms earn strictly positive proﬁts. –I fb o t hﬁrms’ debts equal
d∗,t h en e tp r o ﬁts to the ﬁrm ΠF(s∗,s ∗,d ∗,d ∗) will be strictly positive if ˆ c(d∗,d ∗) >c .
We will argue below that we must have ˆ c(d∗,d ∗) >c . First note that ˆ c(d,d) is strictly
decreasing in d, from assumption 2. Now consider the bondholders lending to ﬁrm i,
who earn
R
B(d,d)=P r ( c ≤ ˆ c(d,d))d +
  ˇ c(d,d)
ˆ c(d,d)
π
∗(d,d,c)f(c)dc
if d1 = d2 = d. Using Leibniz’s rule, the derivative of RB(d,d) with respect to d can
be written as
∂RB(d,d)
∂d
=
∂ Pr(c ≤ ˆ c(d,d))
∂d
d +P r ( c ≤ ˆ c(d,d))
+π
∗(d,d,ˇ c(d,d))f(ˇ c(d,d))
∂ˇ c(d,d)
∂d
−π
∗(d,d,ˆ c(d,d))f(ˆ c(d,d))
∂ˆ c(d,d)
∂d
+
  ˇ c(d,d)
ˆ c(d,d)
∂π∗(d,d,c)
∂d
f(c)dc.
From the deﬁnition of ˇ c(d,d), the third term in this expression equals zero. Further,
since π∗(d,d,ˆ c(d,d)) = d and because f(c) is the probability density function of c,
the ﬁrst and fourth terms cancel out. Now, substituting ˆ c(d,d)=c,w eh a v e
∂RB(d,d)
∂d
 
   
 
ˆ c(d,d)=c
=
  ˇ c(d,d)
c
∂π∗(d,d,c)
∂d
f(c)dc < 0.
Thus, for d∗ =a r gm a x d RB(d,d)w em u s th a v eˆ c(d∗,d ∗) >c .
143. In the auction stage, we cannot have an equilibrium (b1,b 2) such that b1 <b ∗ and
b2 ≤ b∗. – Consider one of the other bidders at the auction, say ﬁrm 3. Such a ﬁrm
can outbid ﬁrm 1 by bidding B3 = b1+ε, with ε such that B3 ≤ b∗. From the previous
step, we have that ﬁrm 3 can ﬁnd ﬁnancing for its bid. Also, it can make strictly
positive proﬁts when doing so. Hence, the original situation is not an equilibrium.
4. Suppose that b1 = b2 = b∗.T h e n ,w h e n a ﬁrm bids some b>b ∗, it is not possible
for both ﬁrms to obtain ﬁnancing. –A t( b1,b 2)=( b∗,b ∗), we saw that there is a
solution of the debt stage where both ﬁrms obtain d = d∗ and bondholders receive
zero expected proﬁts. Now consider the case in which b1 = b∗ and b2 >b ∗. The
conditions (5) imply that to be able to have ﬁnancing for both ﬁrms in the new
situation, we need to ﬁnd a (d1,d 2) such that
R
B
1 (d1,d 2) ≥ R
B(d
∗,d
∗)=b
∗, (6)
and
R
B
2 (d1,d 2) >R
B(d
∗,d
∗)=b
∗. (7)
The argument proceeds in the following steps:
(a) There is no such (d1,d 2) with either d1 = d∗ or d2 = d∗. – Suppose d2 = d∗.
If d1 <d ∗, we have RB
1 (d1,d 2) <R B
1 (d∗,d ∗) from lemma 2, contradicting (6).
If d1 >d ∗, we have RB
2 (d1,d 2) <R B
2 (d∗,d ∗) from lemma 1, contradicting (7).
If d1 = d∗, both (6) and (7) trivially hold with equality, thus ruling out the
possibility d1 = d∗. With the exact same arguments, we cannot have d2 = d∗.
(b) There is no such (d1,d 2) with d1 >d ∗ and d2 >d ∗. – Suppose d1 ≥ d2 >d ∗.
From lemma 1, RB
2 (d1,d 2) ≤ RB
2 (d2,d 2). From assumption 3, RB
2 (d2,d 2) <
RB
2 (d∗,d ∗). Hence RB
2 (d1,d 2) <R B
2 (d∗,d ∗), contradicting (7). With the same
argument, the case d2 ≥ d1 >d ∗ contradicts (6).
(c) There is no such (d1,d 2) with d1 <d ∗ and d2 <d ∗. – Suppose d1 ≤ d2 <d ∗.
From lemma 2, RB
1 (d1,d 2) ≤ RB
1 (d2,d 2). From assumption 3, RB
1 (d2,d 2) <
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1 (d∗,d ∗). Hence RB
1 (d1,d 2) <R B
1 (d∗,d ∗), contradicting (6). With the same
argument, the case d2 ≤ d1 <d ∗ contradicts (7).
(d) There is no such (d1,d 2) with either d1 <d ∗ <d 2 or d2 <d ∗ <d 1. –C o n -
sider the ﬁrst possibility. From lemma 1, RB
1 (d1,d 2) <R B
1 (d1,d ∗). From lemma
2, RB
1 (d1,d ∗) <R B
1 (d∗,d ∗). Hence RB
1 (d1,d 2) <R B
1 (d∗,d ∗), contradicting (6).
With the same argument, the case d2 <d ∗ <d 1 contradicts (7). This estab-
lishes the result.
Hence, we have a unique equilibrium. In that equilibrium, all ﬁrms submit the same
bids, and ﬁrms that win the auction choose the same debt level. That debt level is the com-
mon debt level that maximizes expected repayment to the bondholders. Yet, bondholders
proﬁts are driven to zero. At the auction stage, ﬁrms will increase their bids as long as
they are still able to obtain ﬁnancing, that is, up to the point where expected proﬁts of
bondholders are zero.
Intuitively, this can be understood as follows. Suppose that in equilibrium, we have
debt levels d1 and d2 that do not maximize bondholders’ expected repayments. This cannot
be an equilibrium. Two other ﬁrms are now able to oﬀer a higher expected repayment to
bondholders, which implies that they can also place a higher bid at the auction stage. These
ﬁrms are also willing to place such a higher bid, since expected ﬁrm proﬁts are strictly
positive. Hence, in equilibrium, the expected repayment to bondholders is necessarily
maximized. The equilibrium bids at the auction stage equal those maximum expected
repayments, because of perfect competition in the debt market.
4 Implications
In this section we derive the main results of the model. In particular, we analyze equilibrium
proﬁts, and the consumer price level and the fees paid at the auction in the equilibrium
of our model. We compare prices and fees to those in alternative setups, i.e. compare the
16results from an auction with debt to those with a beauty contest or a standard auction
(without external ﬁnancing).
The ﬁrst result is a corollary from the (proof of the) theorem presented in the previous
section.
Corollary 1 Expected net proﬁts of participants in the auction are strictly positive.
This is despite the fact that there are more than 2 bidders, that all have the same
information. Therefore, when bidders still make positive expected proﬁts, one would expect
the losing bidders to outbid them. That, however, is not the case in the equilibrium of our
model, since we have credit rationing. Suppose one bidder would submit some bid larger
than b∗. To ﬁnance such a bid, the debt this ﬁrm has to take on is necessarily higher than
d∗. B u tm o r ed e b tm a k e saﬁrm more aggressive on the product market, which implies
that the expected repayment to bondholders is lower. Debtholders thus have to provide
more money, but face a lower expected repayment. Since expected proﬁts of bondholders
are zero with the contract (b∗,d ∗), this implies that they are negative for any (b,d)w i t h
b>b ∗ and d>d ∗. Hence, any bidder outbidding b∗ will not be able to ﬁnd ﬁnancing, and
equilibrium proﬁts of ﬁrms are strictly positive.
To see why ﬁrm’s expected equilibrium proﬁts are strictly positive, note the following.
Due to limited liability, ﬁrm proﬁts can never be negative. Hence, when expected proﬁts
are zero, they have to be zero for every possible realization of marginal costs c. In such a
situation, bondholders capture all the operating proﬁts of the ﬁrm. But a lower debt level
increases those operating proﬁts, and hence the expected repayment. Thus, zero expected
proﬁts for ﬁrms cannot maximize the expected repayment to debtholders, which implies
that it cannot be an equilibrium.
This can more easily be seen from Figure ??.T h i sﬁgure describes a ﬁrm’s gross proﬁts,
which are decreasing in the ﬁrm’s debt level d. From gross proﬁts, the amount RB ﬂows
to the bondholders. The ﬁrm is left with the remainder, i.e. the diﬀerence between gross
proﬁts and RB.T h i sd i ﬀerence is called ΠF (the shaded area in the ﬁgure). Clearly, both
RB and ΠF can never exceed gross proﬁts. But expected net ﬁrm proﬁts ΠF can equal
17zero, if the debt level is suﬃciently high. They do so when all (gross) proﬁts ﬂow to the
bondholders (for any realization of c). Since gross proﬁts are decreasing, RB is strictly
concave, and RB cannot exceed the gross proﬁts, this must occur at a tangency point of
the two curves, and this tangency must be to the right of the maximum of RB.T h i s
implies that at the maximum, which describes the equilibrium of our model, expected net
ﬁrm proﬁts ΠF must exceed zero.
Note that expected net ﬁrm proﬁts ΠF equal zero for values of d g r e a t e ro re q u a lt o
the one satisfying ˆ c = c.N o t et h a ti fd exceeds this value, the ﬁrm will earn zero proﬁts
anyway, and the ﬁrm’s incentives are distorted. Therefore, for these values of d,t h eg r o s s
proﬁtc u r v ea sw e l la st h eRB curve are not well deﬁned. This is illustrated by drawing
dashed lines instead of solid lines in the ﬁgure.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Now we turn to consumer prices. We will ﬁrst show that consumer prices are decreasing
i nt h ea m o u n to fd e b to ft h eﬁrms competing on the market.
Proposition 1 In the competition subgame, consumer prices are decreasing in the debt
levels.
Proof. Totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order-condition (FOC) of ﬁrm i in the compe-
tition stage,
∂ΠF
i
∂si
=0 ,
yields
∂2ΠF
i
∂s2
i
dsi +
∂2ΠF
i
∂si∂sj
dsj +
∂2ΠF
i
∂si∂di
ddi =0 .
A similar equality can be given for ﬁrm j. This system of two equations can be solved
using Cramer’s rule to give
dsi
ddi
= −
∂2ΠF
i
∂si∂di
∂2ΠF
j
∂s2
j
H
,
18where
H ≡
∂2ΠF
i
∂s2
i
∂2ΠF
j
∂s2
j
−
∂2ΠF
i
∂si∂sj
∂2ΠF
j
∂sj∂si
.
We assumed uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium of the competition stage. That
requires  
 
   
∂2ΠF
i
∂si∂sj
 
 
    <
 
 
   
∂2ΠF
i
∂s2
i
 
 
   
(see e.g. Tirole, 1988, p. 226), and a similar inequality for ﬁrm j.T h u s ,w eh a v eH>0.
Furthermore, from the second-order-conditions (SOCs), we must have ∂2ΠF
i /∂s2
i < 0, and
the same for ﬁrm j. The sign of
dsi
ddi is therefore the same as the sign of ∂2ΠF
i /∂si∂di.
In order to sign this expression, consider
∂ΠF
i
∂si
=
  ˆ ci(di,dj)
c
∂πi
∂si
(si,s j,c)f(c)dc =0 ( 8 )
(from (3)). Taking the derivative with respect to di,w eﬁnd
∂2ΠF
i
∂si∂di
=
∂πi
∂si
(si,s j,ˆ ci(di,d j))f(ˆ ci(di,d j))
∂ˆ ci(di,d j)
∂di
.
Clearly, f(ˆ ci(di,d j)) > 0. Totally diﬀerentiating the expression that deﬁnes ˆ ci, π∗
i (si,s j,ˆ ci(di,d j))−
di =0 ,y i e l d s
∂π∗
i
∂c
(si,s j,ˆ ci(di,d j))dˆ ci − ddi =0 ,
so ∂ˆ ci(di,d j)/∂di =1 /
∂π∗
i
∂c (si,s j,ˆ ci(di,d j)) < 0. Finally, consider the sign of
∂πi
∂si (si,s j,ˆ ci(di,d j)).
For this, we need the following result:
∂2ΠF
i
∂si∂c
 
< 0i fsi = qi
> 0i fsi = pi
(9)
This can easily be seen from (1) by taking the derivative with respect to c ﬁrst, and then
with respect to si.F r o m ( 9 ) ,
∂πi
∂si (si,s j,ˆ ci(di,d j)) is decreasing in c in case of quantity
competition (si = qi) and increasing in c in case of price competition (si = pi). Also,
from the FOC (8, the integral over the interval [c,ˆ ci(di,d j)] of this expression equals zero.
Evaluated in the upper bound ˆ ci(di,d j), the expression must therefore be negative in case
of quantity competition (si = qi), but positive in case of price competition (si = pi). This
implies
dsi
ddi
 
< 0i fsi = qi
> 0i fsi = pi
.
19Combining this with downward sloping demand, we conclude that ﬁrm i’s price must be
decreasing in the ﬁrm’s debt level.
Intuitively, higher debt leads ﬁrms to focus on more beneﬁcial situations, that is, sit-
uations with lower marginal cost. This is because if marginal cost is very high, the ﬁrms
end up with zero anyway, due to limited liability. The higher the debt level of the ﬁrm,
the larger the range of marginal cost for which the ﬁrm earns zero. So, higher debt implies
a focus on lower marginal cost on average. When marginal cost is lower, ﬁrms set higher
quantities (with quantity competition) or lower prices (with price competition). Thus,
higher debt implies more aggressive competition, i.e. lower prices (Brander and Lewis,
1986).
Several interesting corollaries of this proposition can easily be derived. First, consider
the case of a beauty contest. For sake of comparability, we continue to assume that the
ﬁrms bidding at the auction have zero internal funds.
Corollary 2 A beauty contest leads to higher consumer prices than an auction does.
Proof. This result immediately follows from the above proposition, using the fact that
with a beauty contest, d = 0, whereas in the equilibrium of our model, d = d∗ > 0.
In the equilibrium of our model the equilibrium debt level d∗ is strictly positive, whereas
with a beauty contest licenses are given away for free and d =0 .S i n c eﬁrms compete more
aggressively when they hold debt, consumer prices are lower when licenses are auctioned
-a n dﬁrms are forced to use debt - than when they are given away for free in a beauty
contest.
Now suppose that we replace our auction stage with a mechanism in which government
sets a take-it-or-leave-it fee b. Among all ﬁrms that are willing to pay that fee, government
then randomly assigns the two licenses, and winning ﬁr m sh a v et ot a k eo nd e b tt oﬁnance
b. Again, we continue to assume that the ﬁrms have zero internal funds. Note that a beauty
contest is a special case of this mechanism, with b =0 . We now have the following.
Corollary 3 When the government sets some take-it-or-leave-it fee b ≤ b∗ in the ﬁrst
stage, rather than having an auction, then consumer prices are decreasing in b.
20Proof. This follows from the above proposition if dd/db > 0. It can easily be seen that
this is indeed the case. Recall that the ﬁrms present take-it-or-leave-it debt contracts to
the bondholders. The ﬁrms can therefore maximize their net return ΠF
i . The bondholders
will accept any contract on or below the curve RB (d,d). Since expected gross operating
proﬁts, denoted by G, are decreasing in d by assumption, ΠF
i = G−RB (d,d) is maximized
for the smallest d satisfying b = RB (d,d), that is, the debt contract will always be on the
increasing part of the curve RB (d,d). Thus, we have dd/db > 0. (See also Figure ??.)
Note that our results depend crucially on the strictly positive debt levels that result
from the stage in which the licenses are awarded. For comparison, we now discuss what
happens when ﬁrms do have suﬃcient internal funds. We assume that ﬁrms have internal
funds that are suﬃciently large such that operating losses can never exceed these funds.
That is, if operating proﬁts fall below zero, this is a true loss to the ﬁrm.
Corollary 4 When ﬁrms have access to suﬃcient internal funds, license fees paid at an
auction will be higher than when ﬁrms have to resort to external ﬁnance. Consumer prices
in the former case will be at the same level as they are with a beauty contest. Firms make
zero expected proﬁts.
Proof. In our model, equilibrium license fees are
b
∗ =m a x
d
 
Pr(c ≤ ˆ c(d,d))d +
  ˇ ci(d,d)
ˆ ci(d,d)
π
∗
i(d,d,c)f(c)dc
 
,
where the maximum is obtained for some d∗ > 0. With internal funds, the license fees paid
in equilibrium are (according to standard auction theory)
b
int =
  ˇ ci(0,0)
c
π
∗
i(0,0,c)f(c)dc.
From Assumption 2 we have
π
∗
i(0,0,c) > π
∗
i(d
∗,d
∗,c).
Also, totally diﬀerentiating the expression that determines ˇ ci yields
∂ˇ ci(di,d j)
∂di
= −
∂π∗
i/∂c
∂π∗
i/∂di
(si,s j,ˇ ci(di,d j)) < 0.
21From this, it can be seen that for each realization of c, the contribution to b∗ falls below that
to bint, and we conclude that b∗ <b int.T h i sp r o v e st h eﬁrst statement in the proposition.
The third result follows directly from the set-up of the model: as all ﬁrms are identical,
in a standard auction, all proﬁts will be competed away. Since ﬁrms have no debt and
bids in a standard auction are only sunk costs, the competition stage is not aﬀected by the
auction stage, which implies the second statement.
Clearly, with internal funds there is no strategic eﬀect of debt, and the same price
level results as with a beauty contest. In the auction the ﬁrms bid up to their expected
proﬁts E(π∗) from competing on the output market. Without internal funds, we have
b∗ =m a x d RB(d,d). In order to compare these bid levels, ﬁrst note that the strategic
eﬀe c to fd e b t( a s s u m p t i o n s1a n d2 )i m p l i e st h a to p e r a t i n gp r o ﬁts π will be lower with
external funds for any given realization of c. Now consider the components of E (π∗)a n d
RB(d,d). For small c, we integrate d for the case with external funds, but π >dfor internal
funds. For intermediate values of c, we integrate π in both cases, but this term is higher
for internal funds than it is for external funds. For somewhat larger c, ﬁrms get π with
internal funds but zero with external funds, and for very high c, they get zero in either
case. Summing up, bids must be higher with internal funds than they are with external
funds.
The intuition is straightforward. The strategic eﬀect of debt means more intense com-
petition with (more) debt, and therefore lower expected proﬁts. Furthermore, in our model,
the ﬁrms do not bid up to the level where they have zero expected proﬁts. Instead, the
bidding stops at the point where the bond market is just willing to ﬁnance the bids. Thus,
with external ﬁnance ﬁrms will pay lower fees in the auction than they do with internal
ﬁnance. Also, with internal ﬁnance, there is no strategic eﬀect of debt and therefore prices
are the same as with a beauty contest.
225E x a m p l e s
In this section, we give some numerical examples. We consider a simple Hotelling, Bertrand,
and Cournot game and derive the equilibrium of our model for those cases. We show
that the assumptions we made to derive our results are satisﬁed for these three modes of
competition. For each model, we also derive the equilibrium on the auction, debt, and
product markets for the case where licenses are given away for free in a beauty contest,
and for the case in which an auction is held, but winning ﬁrms can ﬁnance their bids from
internal funds. We illustrate the main results derived in the previous sections by comparing
the results in subsection 5.4.
5.1 Hotelling
Assume that the products of the two winning ﬁrms are not seen as perfect substitutes.
This can be modelled using a Hotelling line of length one, on which one ﬁrm is located
at 0 and the other at 1. In this subsection, we index the winning ﬁrms by their location,
so i =0 ,1. A mass of consumers, normalized to 1, is uniformly distributed on the line.
Note that we can interpret location as taste rather than physical location. For simplicity,
we normalize transportation costs per distance unit to 1. For a consumer located at x,
the costs of purchasing from the ﬁrm located in 0 is given by p0 + x, while the costs of
purchasing from the ﬁrm in 1 is p1 +(1−x), with pi the price charged by the ﬁrm located
at i, i =0 ,1. The willingness to pay is v for every consumer, with v high enough so the
market is always covered. Marginal costs c will be drawn from a uniform distribution on
[0,2], hence f(c)=1 /2a n d[ c,¯ c]=[ 0 ,2].
The indiﬀerent consumer z is given by z = 1
2 (1 + p1 − p0). Operating proﬁts thus equal
πi(pi,p j,c)=
1
2
(1 + pj − pi)(pi − c). (10)
i,j =0 ,1, i  = j. Using these, we have
ˆ ci = pi −
2di
1+pj − pi
23and ˇ ci = pi. In stage 3, ﬁrm is expected net operating proﬁts equal
Π
F
i =
    ci
0
 
1
2
(1 + pj − pi)(pi − c) − di
 
1
2
dc.
Plugging in ˆ ci and πi(pi,p j,c),
Π
F
i (pi,p j,d i,d j)=
(pi (1 + pj − pi) − 2di)
2
8(1+pj − pi)
. (11)
Note that in equilibrium the debt a ﬁrm takes on can never be higher than the maximum
operating proﬁts it can make (substituting c =0a n dd = 0), hence in equilibrium we have
d<1
2.T a k i n gt h eﬁrst-order condition of (11) yields four possible solutions for pi:
p
1
i =
1
2
(1 + pj)+
1
2
 
(1 + pj)
2 − 8di,
p
2
i =
1
2
(1 + pj) −
1
2
 
(1 + pj)
2 − 8di,
p
3
i =
5
6
(1 + pj)+
1
6
 
(1 + pj)
2 +2 4 di,
p
4
i =
5
6
(1 + pj) −
1
6
 
(1 + pj)
2 +2 4 di. (12)
Yet, plugging either p1
i and p2
i back into the numerator of (11) yields zero proﬁts, which
implies that these roots are not feasible. Note also that 1 + pj − p3
i = 1
6 (1 + pj) −
1
6
 
(1 + pj)
2 +2 4 di, which implies that when using p3
i the denominator of (11) becomes
negative, which implies negative proﬁts. Therefore, p4
i is the only relevant solution. It is
not possible to ﬁnd a clean analytical solution for equilibrium prices for general values of di
and dj. Suppose both ﬁrms have the same level of debt d. We can then solve for equilibrium
prices to ﬁnd
p
∗(d,d)=2− 2d. (13)
It can be shown that the second-order conditions for the ﬁrms’ problem at the competition
stage are satisﬁed for any d<1
2.
Note that the reaction functions (12) are increasing in the rival’s price. Suppose d1
increases. Then, the reaction curve of ﬁrm 1 shifts inwards, while that of ﬁrm 0 is unaf-
fected. Equilibrium prices of both ﬁrms then decrease. Yet, the equilibrium price of ﬁrm 1
decreases by more than that of ﬁrm 0, since reaction curves have a slope that is necessarily
24smaller than 1. But that implies that both price and market share of ﬁrm 0 decrease -
the latter being the case since the total size of the market is ﬁxed, and the price of ﬁrm
1 decreases by more than that of ﬁrm 0. Thus, equilibrium operating proﬁts of ﬁrm 0 are
decreasing in the debt level of ﬁrm 1, so assumption 1 is satisﬁed.
Plugging (13) back into (10), we have
π
∗
i(d,d,c)=1− d −
1
2
c.
This implies that π∗
i(d,d,c)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nd, a n da s s u m p t i o n2i ss a t i s ﬁed.
With a common debt level d, we have ˆ c0 =ˆ c1 =2− 4d and ˇ c0 = ˇ c1 =2− 2d. Hence,
R
B(d,d)=
1
2
(2 − 4d)d +
  2−2d
2−4d
1
2
 
1 − d −
1
2
c
 
dc
= d −
3
2
d
2.
Thus, RB(d,d) is strictly concave in d on the relevant interval, and d∗ ≡ argmaxd RB(d,d)=
1
3 > 0. Therefore, assumption 3 is also satisﬁed, which implies that we can apply theo-
rem 1. In this case, the unique equilibrium thus has d∗ = 1
3,b ∗ = RB(d∗,d ∗)=1
6,a n d
p∗ = p∗(1
3, 1
3)=4
3. Firms earn strictly positive expected proﬁts, which equal 1
18   0.055556.
5.2 Bertrand
Now consider a model of Bertrand competition among two ﬁrms, i =1 ,2, producing
heterogeneous goods. Inverse demand for ﬁrm i’s product is given by
pi =1− qi − θqj,
for i,j =1 ,2, i  = j,w h e r eqi is the quantity sold by ﬁrm i and θ ∈ (0,1) is a parameter
measuring the degree of product heterogeneity. With θ close to 1 we have relatively ho-
mogeneous goods. When θ is close to 0 the products are strongly diﬀerentiated. Demand
c a nb ew r i t t e ni nd i r e c tf o r ma s
qi =
1
1+θ
 
1+
θ
1 − θ
pj −
1
1 − θ
pi
 
.
25Assume that marginal costs c will be drawn from a uniform distribution on [0,1], hence
f(c)=1o n[ c,¯ c]=[ 0 ,1]. Operating proﬁts of ﬁrm i are given by
πi(pi,p j,c)=
1
1+θ
 
1+
θ
1 − θ
pj −
1
1 − θ
pi
 
(pi − c). (14)
From this expression,
ˆ ci = pi −
(1 − θ2)di
1 − θ + θpj − pi
and ˇ ci = pi.U s i n gt h i s ,w eﬁnd
Π
F
i =
(pi(1 − θ + θpj − pi) − (1 − θ2)di)
2
2(1− θ2)(1− θ + θpj − pi)
.
Again, taking the ﬁrst-order condition yields four possible solutions, and using the same
strategy as in the case of Hotelling competition, we can eliminate three. The relevant
solution is
pi =
5
6
(1 − θ + θpj)+
1
6
 
(1 − θ + θpj)
2 +1 2( 1− θ2)di. (15)
As before, it is not possible to ﬁnd a clean analytical solution for equilibrium prices.
Consider the case in which both ﬁrms face the same debt d. We then have
p
∗(d,d)=
1
6 − 4θ
 
5 − 4θ −
 
(1 + 4d(1 + θ)(3− 2θ))
 
. (16)
Again, the reaction functions are increasing, and an increase in dj shifts inwards the
reaction curve for ﬁrm j. This decreases both pi and pj,b u tpj decreases by more. Note
that the slope of the reaction function (15) is smaller than θ, so the change in pj is larger
in absolute value than 1
θ times the change in pi. Using (14) this implies that π∗
i (di,d j,c)
decreases. This implies that π∗
i (di,d j,c) is strictly decreasing in dj, and assumption 1 is
satisﬁed. Further,
π
∗(d,d,c)=
2d(1 + θ)(−3+2 θ)+( 2− 2θ − 3c +2 cθ)
 
1+
 
(1 + 12d +4 dθ − 8dθ2)
 
2(3− 2θ)
2 (1 + θ)
.
It can be veriﬁed that for θ not too small, this is strictly decreasing in d.A sa ne x a m p l e ,
consider θ = 1
2;t h e n
π
∗(d,d,c)=
1
24
 
1+
 
(1 + 12d)
  
3 −
 
(1 + 12d) − 4c
 
26is strictly decreasing in d.T h i sc o n ﬁrms assumption 2 for θ = 1
2.
We also have:
R
B(d,d)=
2(1− θ)
(3 − 2θ)
d −
(5 + 3θ − 2θ2)d2
1+
 
(1 + 4d(1 + θ)(3− 2θ))
It can be veriﬁed that RB(d,d) is strictly concave in d, hence assumption 3 is satisﬁed.
With θ = 1
2,w eh a v ed∗ = 1
54 + 1
27
√
7   0.11651, b∗ = RB(d∗,d ∗)= 25
√
7−1
324(5+
√
7)   0.026297,
and p∗ = 7
12 − 1
12
√
7   0.36285. Firms’ expected net proﬁts are ΠF(d∗,d ∗)= 1
144
(
√
7−4)
2
5+
√
7  
1.6658 × 10−3 > 0.
5.3 Cournot
Finally, we consider quantity competition among the two ﬁrms, i =1 ,2. Suppose inverse
demand is
p =1− q1 − q2.
Again, we assume f(c) = 1 on [0,1]. Operating proﬁts then are
πi(pi,p j,c)=( 1− qi − qj − c)qi (17)
i,j =1 ,2, i  = j. From this expression,
ˆ ci =1− qi − qj −
di
qi
and ˇ ci =1− qi − qj.U s i n gt h i s ,w eﬁnd
Π
F
i =
1
2qi
(qi (1 − qi − qj) − di)
2 .
Again, taking the ﬁrst-order condition yields for possible solutions, three of which can be
eliminated. The relevant solution is
qi =
1
6
−
1
6
qj +
1
6
  
1 − 2qj + q2
j +1 2 di
 
. (18)
When ﬁrms face the same debt d, we have
q
∗(d,d)=
1
8
+
1
8
 
(1 + 16d). (19)
27Reaction functions (18) are now decreasing, and an increase in dj shifts the reaction
curve for ﬁrm j outwards. This increases qj but decreases qi. The slope of the reaction
function (18) exceeds −1, so the change in qj is larger than that in qi (in absolute value).
Using (17) this implies that π∗
i (di,d j,c) decreases with dj, so assumption 1 is satisﬁed.
Further,
π
∗(d,d,c)=
1
32
 
3 −
 
(1 + 16d) − 4c
  
1+
 
(1 + 16d)
 
.
This expression is strictly decreasing in d,c o n ﬁrming assumption 2. Also, we can derive
R
B(d,d)=
1
2
d
 
1 −
16d
1+
 
(1 + 16d)
 
,
which is strictly concave in d. Further, d∗ =a r gm a x d RB(d,d)= 1
72+ 1
36
√
7   0.087382 > 0.
In the equilibrium of the game with Cournot competition in the third stage, we have
b∗ = RB(d∗,d ∗)= 25
√
7−1
432(5+
√
7)   0.019723; d∗ = 1
72 + 1
36
√
7   0.087382; and p∗ = 7
12− 1
12
√
7  
0.36285. Firms’ expected net proﬁts are ΠF(d∗,d ∗)= 1
192
(
√
7−4)
2
5+
√
7   1.2493 × 10−3 > 0.
5.4 Summary of examples
In the three examples above, we derived the equilibrium of the game described in section 2
w h e r ei nt h et h i r ds t a g eﬁrms compete according to the Hotelling, Bertrand, and Cournot
models. Now, we compare the results in diﬀerent setups.
Recall that in our model, the two ﬁrms competing on the output market have obtained
a license at a sealed-bid auction, and they have used debt to ﬁnance their winning bids.
Alternatively, we could consider a beauty contest, in which licenses are simply assigned to
two ﬁrms, and no fee is involved. In that case, ﬁrms have no debt. We also assume that
there is no limited liability in this case. That is, for a given price level, if the realization of
marginal cost turns out to be high, ﬁrms may have strictly negative proﬁts. By maximizing
expected operating proﬁts
E (π)=
  ¯ c
c
πi(si,s j,c)f(c)dc,
we ﬁnd that the Hotelling model results in p∗ = 2. Both the Bertrand model with θ = 1
2
and the Cournot model yield p∗ = 2
3.
28However, also with a beauty contest, ﬁrm proﬁts may turn out to be negative, when
ﬁrms behave aggressively and c turns out to be high. Even though the ﬁrm does not have to
take on debt, it still faces the possibility of having negative operating proﬁts. Therefore, we
also study the case of a beauty contest with limited liability. In that case, ﬁrms maximize
E(π)=
  ˇ c(0,0)
c
πi(si,s j,c)f(c)dc.
An alternative setup is a license auction where ﬁrms do have internal funds to pay their
license fees. This is the case usually studied in auction theory. Again we assume that
there is no limited liability, or alternatively, that ﬁrms have suﬃcient internal funds. In
this setup, d = 0 as well, and equilibrium prices will be the same as with a beauty contest.
However, in equilibrium, ﬁrms do have to pay a license fee now, equal to their winning
bids in the auction. As predicted by standard auction theory, the ﬁrms will bid up to their
expected proﬁts from competing on the output market. For the Hotelling model, using
p∗ =2 ,w eh a v eb∗ = E (π∗)=1
2. For the Bertrand model with θ = 1
2, b∗ = 1
27, and for the
Cournot model we ﬁnd b∗ = 1
36.
Table 1 summarizes these results, illustrating that the main results (in particular, the
corollaries) presented in the previous sections indeed hold in our three examples.
6 Discussion and conclusion
We have shown that license auctions when winning bids are ﬁnanced through debt lead to
diﬀerent outcomes than standard auction theory predicts. At least in our framework there
may be a negative relation between consumer prices and the fees paid. Thus, higher fees
may imply lower prices for consumers. Further, we argued that when ﬁrms use external
funds to ﬁnance licenses, both the fees and the resulting consumer price are lower than with
internal funds. These results are driven by the strategic eﬀect of debt, or more precisely,
the strategic eﬀect of limited liability. If ﬁrms pay higher fees to obtain their license, they
need more debt and compete more aggressively by setting lower prices. Also, we have
s h o w nt h a tw i t hd e b tﬁnancing, the winners of the auction have strictly positive expected
29Setup b∗ d∗ p∗
Hotelling
-b e a u t yc o n t e s t --2
- with internal funds --2
- auction with internal funds 1/2 - 2
- auction with debt 1/6 1/3 4/3
Bertrand (θ = 1
2)
-b e a u t yc o n t e s t -- 2 / 3
- with internal funds -- 1 / 2
- auction with internal funds 1/27 0.037 - 2/3
- auction with debt 25
√
7−1
324(5+
√
7)
1
54 + 1
27
√
7 7
12 − 1
12
√
7
 0.026  0.117  0.363
Cournot
-b e a u t yc o n t e s t -- 2 / 3
with internal funds -- 1 / 2
- auction with internal funds 1/36 0.028 - 2/3
- auction with debt 25
√
7−1
432(5+
√
7)
1
72 + 1
36
√
7 7
12 − 1
12
√
7
 0.020  0.087  0.363
Table 1: Equilibrium bids, debts, and prices when ﬁrms compete on the output market
according to the Hotelling, Bertrand, or Cournot model and licenses are allocated using a
beauty contest or an auction.
proﬁts. They are simply not able to bid up to the point where their bids equal the expected
payoﬀ from competition, because of credit rationing.
These results suggest that in deciding whether or not to auction, and in auction design,
it is important to realize how winners will ﬁnance their bids. When external ﬁnance
is used, results from standard auction theory, implicitly based on internal ﬁnance, do not
necessarily apply. Winning bids and consumer prices are lower, and expected net proﬁts for
winners are strictly positive. However, it is not straightforward to see what this implies for
social welfare. Prices are lower in equilibrium, but the probability that ﬁrms go bankrupt
increases.
In our model, we made a number of simplifying assumptions, for example with respect
to the uncertainty that winning bidders face on the product market. We assumed that this
uncertainty concerns the level of marginal cost. One may argue that uncertainty is more
30likely to concern ﬁxed costs rather than marginal costs. However, our model can easily
be adapted to address this type of uncertainty, without aﬀecting the qualitative result.
We only need that the uncertainty about ﬁx e dc o s t si sn o tr e s o l v e dw h e nﬁrms set their
strategic variables in the competition stage. For our results, it is necessary that more debt
makes ﬁrms more aggressive. Alternatively, there may be uncertainty about demand. This,
however, could change the results of our model. Showalter (1995) shows that in this case,
and with price competition, the strategic eﬀe c to fd e b ti m p l i e st h a th i g h e rd e b tl e a d st o
higher prices rather than lower prices.
Our model can be extended in a number of ways. One straightforward extension con-
cerns the number of licenses that is being sold. In our model, N>2 potential entrants
compete for 2 licenses. Alternatively, they could compete for n licenses, with 2 ≤ n ≤ N.
On the output market, n ﬁrms would then compete. In this setup, there would still be a
strategic eﬀect of debt. However, an increase in n will imply a decrease in the bids because
of lower expected operating proﬁts, and thus in the debt level. Thus, an increase in n
weakens the strategic eﬀects of debt which may decrease ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts.
It would also be interesting to look at asymmetries in the amount of internal funds that
ﬁrms have, for example by looking at a case in which some ﬁrms are able to fully ﬁnance
their bids on through internal funds, whereas other ﬁrms have to ﬁnance their entire bid on
the credit market. One possible interpretation of such a scenario is that incumbent ﬁrms
have their own funds, whereas potential entrants need debt ﬁnancing.
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